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ABSTRACT 
REDUCING THE RISKS OF WRONG SITE SURGERY  
USING THE JOINT COMMISSION’S TARGETED SOLUTIONS  
TOOL FOR SAFE SURGERY 
by Stephanie Kelly Parks 
 
May 2015 
 
The purpose of this project was to utilize the Institute for HealthCare 
Improvement’s Model of Improvement as a consultation framework to facilitate 
improvement in core processes for the prevention of wrong site surgery (WSS) using The 
Joint Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Program at a surgery 
center in Mississippi.  The TST Program was conducted across 6 months and had 6 
phases: 1) Getting Started, 2) Training Data Collectors, 3) Measuring Risk Factors, 4) 
Analyzing Data, 5) Implementing Solutions, and 6) Sustaining the Gains.   A 
convenience sample of 47 surgical staff participated and 8 data collectors observed 
behaviors.  The nurse consultant, using the TST program, assisted staff in reducing the 
risk of WSS from 16% to 9% in surgical booking, 86% to 53% in pre-op/holding, and 
73% to 25% in the OR, and empowered them to make 9 practice decisions (just-in-time 
coaching; improved communication between scheduling and pre-admissions; OR 
schedule fax back; primary documents within 48 hours before surgery; standardized 
patient verification; set up regional block time-out (TO) and role-based TO; standardized 
surgical site marking and adoption of a surgical checklist). Nurse consultants play a 
powerful role in enabling surgical staff to reexamine existing practice, change behavior, 
and create a culture of safety in reducing the risks of WSS and promoting patient safety.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. King, a 51-year-old male with a history of type 2 diabetes and chronic 
ulcerations of both lower extremities went to his physician because both heels were badly 
inflamed with the left showing signs of slow improvement while the right heel showed 
signs of infection.  Upon examination, his physician informed him that he required a right 
below-the-knee amputation as soon as possible due to the extent of the infection and 
presence of wet gangrene extending above his ankle. Mr. King agreed to the surgery and 
prior to his departure, the office staff scheduled the surgery with the surgeon and surgical 
service. Mr. King was admitted through the emergency department for an amputation of 
his right leg.   
Immediately, the surgeon called ahead with orders and request to obtain a signed 
surgical consent from the patient. Upon arrival on the surgical service, Mr. King signed 
the surgical consent form and was prepped for the amputation.  By the time the surgeon 
arrived in the operating room (OR), the patient was intubated, asleep, and the procedure 
was ready to begin.  The surgeon made the incisions cutting through the major nerves and 
arteries of the left leg. Several minutes later, an anxious circulating nurse called out to the 
surgical team that the surgical consent was for the right leg. Well past the point of return, 
the amputation was performed on Mr. King’s less infected and improving left leg 
(Agrawal, 2014).     
Medical Errors 
In the United States, medical errors are the eighth leading cause of death, 
exceeding the annual number associated with motor vehicle accidents (Institute of 
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Medicine [IOM], 1999).  Approximately, 44,000 to 98,000 people die due to medical–
related errors on an annual basis (IOM, 1999).     
The Joint Commission, the primary accreditation group for many healthcare 
organizations in the United States, has identified a set of critical health and medical 
errors, referred to as ‘sentinel events,’ that compromise patient safety and which must be 
immediately addressed. A sentinel event is defined as “an event that is unexpected and 
involves death, serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof” (Joint 
Commission, 2014, p. 1).  Wrong site surgery (WSS) is classified as a sentinel event 
according to the Joint Commission. 
Incidence of Wrong Site Surgery 
The Joint Commission defines WSS as surgery on the wrong organ, wrong 
person, or the wrong surgical site (Joint Commission, 2013), and states the problem is 
worsening.  In 2005, it was ranked the second most frequently reported sentinel event to 
the Joint Commission, while it ranked number one in 2014 (Joint Commission, 2014).  
Every year, approximately 2,000 patients or 40 patients per week are victimized by WSS 
(Center for Transforming Health [CTH], 2011). Medical errors involving wrong-site, 
wrong-procedure, or wrong-patient surgery have been estimated to potentially impact at 
least one patient per year in a 300-bed hospital (Kelly, 2012).     
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Failure of Site Verification in WSS 
 There are a myriad of human and system failures contributing to WSS. The 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) notes that WSS is due to “faulty systems, processes, and 
conditions that lead people to make mistakes or fail to prevent them” (IOM, 1999, p. 2).   
At the core of these errors are communication failures. Examples of poor communication 
related to WSS include, but are not limited to, the surgeon providing wrong site 
information via phone to the surgical scheduler or the surgical scheduler incorrectly 
transposing right from left sided procedures. Examples of incomplete patient assessments 
are x-ray films accidently reversed or patients that are not physically examined by the 
surgeon immediately prior to transport to the operating room. An example of an error in 
judgment may be when surgery was intended for the left leg but staff prepped and draped 
the right leg.  
 In the case of Mr. King, analysis reveals a series of system and communication 
failures leading to the wrong leg amputated and, subsequently, the need for bilateral leg 
amputations.  The surgeon did not obtain surgical consent and site verification with the 
patient but was instead obtained by surgery personnel; the wrong procedure was placed 
on the surgical schedule; the operative site was not marked by the surgeon; the incorrect 
leg was prepped and draped prior to the surgeon’s arrival to the OR; and there was no 
‘Time-Out’ site verification performed by the surgical team prior to the first incision. 
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Financial and Personal cost of WSS 
WSS is avoidable; however, when it occurs it has financial consequences for 
patients, providers, and health care facilities and an immeasurable impact on the quality 
of life of patients. The severity and extent of damage related to the WSS determines the 
personal and financial costs associated with the WSS. 
The personal cost of WSS may have devastating emotional, physical, and 
economic consequences for patients and their families, including but not limited to loss of 
employment, income, mobility, and inability to engage in activities of daily living and 
those activities that bring meaning to the patient. In the case of Mr. King, the state 
authorities fined the surgeon $10,000 and suspended the surgeon’s license for a 6-month 
period. The hospital paid Mr. King $900,000 and the surgeon paid an additional $250,000 
directly to Mr. King (Agrawal, 2014). 
The professional cost of WSS results in a negative impact on the surgical team.  
Healthcare providers can become the ‘second victims’ when their patients are victimized 
by adverse clinical events such as WSS.  This phenomenon causes providers to question 
their clinical skills, medical knowledge, and possibly their choice of career (Agrawal, 
2014).   
State licensure boards are imposing penalties on surgeons for WSS.  Some 
insurers have decided to no longer pay providers for WSS or wrong-person surgery, or 
for leaving a foreign object in a patient’s body after surgery. Surgery performed on the 
wrong site or wrong person has often been held compensable under malpractice claims. 
In fact, “84% of wrong-site orthopedic and 79% of wrong-site eye surgery claims 
resulted in malpractice awards” (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008, p. 381).   
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The organizational cost of WSS is also costly. Loss of public trust in the 
healthcare system and its providers occurs after negative media attention resulting from a 
WSS event.  Defending these types of errors is nearly impossible and those involved 
usually pay a significant financial, professional, and emotional price for the event.   
Efforts to Reduce WSS 
In 1995, the Joint Commission required mandatory reporting of every WSS event.  
According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2015), the Joint 
Commission developed and implemented The Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong 
Site, Wrong Procedure, and Wrong Person Surgery in 2004, also referred to as the 
Universal Protocol (UP-Appendix A). 
The three principal components of the UP included a pre-procedure verification, 
site marking, and a time out (Joint Commission, 2015b). Since 2006, all hospitals, 
ambulatory care facilities, and office-based surgery programs accredited by the Joint 
Commission are required to use the UP and all insurance companies require adherence to 
the UP for reimbursement.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) mandate that in order to 
receive reimbursement, medical facilities must use a safe surgery checklist that reflects 
the steps found in the UP. Beginning in 2015, the CMS have mandated that every health 
care facility conducting surgical procedures must use a safe surgery checklist in order to 
receive reimbursement. The checklist must demonstrate effective communication and 
safe practices during three perioperative periods:  prior to anesthesia, prior to skin 
incision, and prior to the patient leaving the procedure area.  While there is no one 
specific mandated checklist, several exist to include one developed by the Universal 
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Protocol established by the Joint Commission (Appendix A), the Surgical Safety 
Checklist established by the World Health Organization (WHO-Appendix B), and the 
Comprehensive Surgical Checklist established by the Association of periOperative 
Registered Nurses (AORN-Appendix C). 
In order to maximize patient safety, reduce the risks of WSS, and optimize quality 
patient care and outcomes, the Joint Commission’s Center for Transforming Health 
developed the Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program 
(TST) to reduce the risk of WSS. The TST Program consists of a six-phase process 
guiding health care organizations through a “step-by-step” process to accurately assess 
their organization’s true performance, identify their barriers to performance excellence, 
and facilitate them to proven solutions that specifically address their particular obstacles 
(Center For Transforming Health [CTH], 2011). The phases progress from 1) Getting 
Started, 2) Training Data Collectors, 3) Measuring Risk Factors, 4) Analyzing Data, 5) 
Implementing Solutions, to 6) Sustaining the Gains. In the pilot test of the TST Program, 
the 7 participating hospitals and ambulatory centers “were able to reduce the number of 
cases with risks by 46 percent in the scheduling area, by 63 percent in pre-operative (pre-
op), and by 51 percent in the OR” (Joint Commission, 2013, p. 2).  
Statement of the Purpose 
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare 
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley, Nolan, Nolan, Norman, & 
Provost, 2009) as a consultation framework to facilitate organizational improvement in 
core processes for the prevention of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site, 
procedure using The Joint Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© 
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Quality Improvement Program among a surgical team (schedulers, pre-op personnel, 
perioperative personnel, and surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South 
Mississippi.  The primary purposes of using the TST Program were to:  1) identify 
breakdowns in patient care, 2) discover the underlying causes of the breakdown, and 3) 
generate solutions that are organization-specific to the causes of wrong-site surgeries.   
 
Consultation Framework - IHI “Model of Improvement” 
The IHI ‘Model of Improvement’ (Langley et al., 2009) was used to facilitate 
organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention of WSS using the TST 
Program among a surgical team at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi. 
Fundamental concepts and steps of this change model are based on ‘Plan-Do-Study-Act’ 
(PDSA) cycle proposed by The Deming Institute (2013). The anticipated and achieved 
outcome of this process was that the surgical team at one surgical center came to value 
and incorporate the TST Program as the standard and best practices approach to reduce 
the incidence of WSS. 
Application of the IHI and TST Cycles for Sustained WSS Improvement 
For this capstone project, concepts of the IHI ‘Plan-Do-Study-Act’ (PDSA) 
Model of Improvement’ and TST cycles for sustained WSS improvement were utilized in 
order to evoke a change in practice. The application of these processes is described below 
and is illustrated in Figure 1.     
• During the ‘IHI Planning Phase’, the consultant facilitated change by 
engaging several key players from the surgical team and organization in the 
Getting Started TST Phase.  By the end of this phase, the consultant assessed 
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their buy-in and readiness to take action to adopt a safe surgery checklist for 
reducing the risk of WSS at their facility (Joint Commission, 2014).  
• During the ‘IHI Doing Phase’, the consultant facilitated change by 1) enabling 
the team to identify the specific types of data to be collected in each surgical 
area using the appropriate forms, i.e., The Surgical Booking Process Audit 
Tool, The Pre-op Holding Process Audit Tool and the Operating Audit Tool, 
2) conducting the training of data collectors, and 3) assuring that data 
collectors measured compliance with accuracy and a high level of inter-rater 
reliability. This phase coincided with the TST phases of ‘Training Data 
Collectors’ and ‘Measuring Risk Factors.’  The consultant was responsible 
solely for entering all data into the secure Joint Commission Connect extranet 
and generating findings.  
• During the ‘IHI Studying Phase’, the consultant presented the evidence-based 
findings to the entire surgical team and facilitated a dialogue on analyzing 
data that contribute to safe care and risk of errors by generating solutions for 
improvement at the surgical center.  This phase coincided with the TST phase 
‘Analyzing Data.’ 
• During the ‘IHI Acting Phase’, the consultant led the team to 1) implement 
their solutions and 2) confirm a continuous quality improvement plan for on-
going measurement of compliance, sustaining positive changes evoked from 
the process across over time, and educating new staff to this process.   This 
final phase coincided with the TST phases ‘Implementing Solutions’ and 
‘Sustaining the Gains.’  
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Figure 1. IHI PDSA-Joint Commission Safe Surgery Program. 
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Significance of this Project 
WSS is an avoidable event. Patient safety must be the core, overriding value of 
every decision made by health professionals.  To enact patient safety, we must not only 
‘Do Good and Do No Harm’ but must create a culture of safety, challenging one another 
to examine the prevalence, causes, and potential solutions for medical errors. The overall 
aim of this project was to serve as an advanced practice nurse consultant empowering 
surgical staff to reexamine existing practice, change behaviors as needed, and create a 
culture of safety in reducing the risks of WSS and promoting patient safety. 
Review of Literature 
The following databases were used to investigate WSS and related topics:  
Cochrane, PubMed of the National Library of Medicine, Cumulative Index of Nursing 
and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), and Google Scholar.  
Human and System Failures Contributing to WSS 
There is consensus (DeVine, Chutkan, Norvell, & Dettori, 2010; Dunn, 2006; 
Hempel et al., 2013; Mulloy, 2008) in the reporting of evidence related to human and 
system failures contributing to WSS.  Communication is the leading error contributing to 
WSS.  In a systematic review, Hempel et al. (2013) identified 125 empirical studies and 
four clinical practice guidelines published from 2004 through 2013 that reported causes 
of WSS. Their analysis revealed that primary root causes of wrong-site surgery were due 
to 1) communication problems such as incorrect information and misperceptions of 
information, 2) not following policies, 3) not performing safety procedures in a 
meaningful way, 4) inadequate policies, and 5) the lack of procedural standardization 
contributed to WSS events. As an outcome of this evidence synthesis, the researchers 
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recommended that a standardized protocol to prevent WSS be developed for all health 
care facilities conducting surgeries.   
By 2005, communication was cited as the major cause of WSS accounting for 
70% of WSS, followed by “deficits of procedural compliance (64%), leadership (46%), 
competency and credentialing (29%), availability of information (28%), organizational 
culture (23%), orientation and training (20%), patient assessment (18%), care planning 
(17%), staffing (10%), environmental safety/security (10%), and continuum of care 
(5%)” (Joint Commission, 2013, p. 5).  Mulloy (2008) found similar results when 
examining the efficacy of the ‘AORN Correct Site Surgery Tool Kit’ (Appendix C) and 
the UP (Appendix A) among 519 registered nurses and 325 non-registered nurse-surgical 
technician respondents. A root cause analysis of WSS was conducted and revealed three 
recurring communication risk situations: 1) communication failures with the patient and 
among members of the surgical team, 2) communication failures during the preoperative 
assessment of the patient, and 3) communication failures when verifying the correct 
operative site.  Mulloy (2008) found that 91% of registered nurses and 73% of non-
registered nurse--surgical technicians reported the AORN toolkit was helpful.  
Dunn (2006) analyzed 455 WSS records and found that in 80% of the cases, 
inadequate communication was the root cause of the event. Stahel et al. (2010) found that 
out of 27,370 self-reported adverse occurrences, 85% of WSS events were due to errors 
in judgment while 72% were due to failure to perform a surgical ‘time-out’ prior to 
incision.    
Surgical errors take a variety of forms.  DeVine et al., (2010) conducted a 
systematic review of 433,528 spinal surgical cases in Pennsylvania to determine the 
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incidence of surgical errors.  There were 427 incidences of WSS with 70% related to 
wrong-side surgeries, 56% to ‘near-misses’, 14% to wrong location/level surgeries, 9% to 
wrong procedures, and 8% to the wrong patient.  The findings showed that WSS is the 
result of breakdowns in communication related to incorrect surgical site verification and 
incorrect communication between the surgical team.  It also showed that WSS resulted 
from failure to verify patient information prior to surgery. The clinical recommendations 
of this systematic review suggest that the use of the Joint Commission UP alone is 
insufficient to prevent WSS.  From this review, the clinical recommendations posit that in 
addition to the Joint Commission UP there be intraoperative images taken after the 
surgical site is visualized.  Preoperative images are then compared to these images in the 
room to ensure the correct level of spinal surgery.   
Use of the IHI ‘Model of Improvement’ in Health Care Organizations by the Consultant 
The Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) model for improvement is a helpful tool used to 
rapidly change the way an organization operates in the health care industry.  It was 
originally developed by the Associates in Process Improvement then later adopted by the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) to conduct rapid cycle research focused on 
quality improvement in health care agencies.    
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Figure 2. IHI PDSA Model of Change (How to Improve section, para. 2). 
The IHI describes the phases as follows. During the ‘Plan Phase’, the consultant 
guides the process by facilitating: 1) recruitment of team members, 2) drafting a purpose 
statement, and 3) describing the problem, and identifying the causes of the problem. 
During the ‘Do Phase’, the consultant aids the team in: 1) starting to implement action 
plan for change and 2) collecting data pertinent to change topic. During the ‘Study 
Phase’, the consultant guides the team in using the purpose statement from ‘Plan Phase’ 
and data gathered in ‘Do Phase’ in order to discern if 1) an improvement was made as 
result of the plan selected, 2) if the plan was worth the investment, and 3) if there were 
any unintended side effects. During the ‘Act Phase’, the consultant helps the team 1) 
reflect on their plan and outcomes, 2) acknowledge their improvement and processes 
learned, 3) verbalize successes to internal and external stakeholders, and 4) set in place 
guidelines to preserve gains and sustain achievements. 
 Program in Health Care Organizations by the Consultant 
The Center for Transforming Healthcare (CTH) created the TST Program to assist 
health care organizations through a step-by-step process to identify, quantify, and reduce 
PLAN
DO
STUDY
ACT
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risks of WSS.  The TST was first used in 2009 as a result of the Joint Commission’s 
systematic approach of “Robust Process Improvement (RPI)” to analyze specific 
breakdowns in care, discover their underlying causes, and develop solutions that are 
targeted to the causes of wrong-site surgeries (Joint Commission, 2015c).  The TST 
Program focuses on minimizing risks across the surgical areas, including surgical 
booking area, pre-op area, and the operating room. The TST Program addresses routine 
surgeries only and excludes procedures done outside of the main operating room area, 
such as, cystoscopies, endoscopies, surgical procedures coming from the emergency 
department, and multiple procedures that occur during the same operative case that are 
performed by different surgeons.   
The TST Program is designed to be readily used by an organization’s surgical 
team without requiring any additional resources to implement the program.  Each of the 
six steps outlines key action items that must be completed before the subsequent step is 
initiated. The TST Program enables the surgical team to examine specific causes that 
could result in a WSS event within their organization and provides them with a targeted 
solution implementation plan for process improvement to reduce the risk of WSS.  
Fundamental to the program is the use of Lean Six Sigma to enable the surgical team 
from scheduler through incision to realize the causes of WSS and stop the chain of events 
that result in the breakdown of patient care.  
The six phases of TST Program are 1) ‘Getting Started’, 2) ‘Training Data 
Collectors’, 3) ‘Measuring Risk Factors’, 4) ‘Analyzing Data’, 5) ‘Implementing 
Solutions’, and 6) ‘Sustaining the Gains.’ Each of these phases is described on the 
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website designed to assist organizations in the implementation of the tool (Joint 
Commission, 2015d).   
The ‘Getting Started Phase’ consists of defining the scope of the project and 
gathering the surgical team and stakeholders to assess their buy-in and readiness to 
change. During this phase, the consultant guides the process by facilitating 1) discussion 
about safe surgery with surgical staff and 2) the identification of committed team 
members and stakeholders.  
The ‘Training Data Collectors Phase’, the consultant focuses on educating 
observers to gain a clear picture of what is to be observed in three key surgical areas: 1) 
the surgical booking area, 2) the pre-op holding area, and 3) the operating room.  Data 
collectors undergo specific training by watching area-specific videos, learning how to 
correctly complete data collection audit tools, and must successfully complete a written 
the “Safe Surgery” post-test with a 90% or higher score. Further, the data collectors are 
trained to provide the observers in each area with ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching strategies 
when near misses are anticipated. 
During the ‘Measuring Risk Factors Phase’, the trained observers begin direct 
observation of how procedures are performed in each of the three areas. Findings are 
recorded on the data collection audit tools specific for each area. These baseline 
observations are the basis for future comparisons of performance and improvements.  The 
TST Program recommends that baseline data be collected across a two-week time period 
resulting in a minimum of 50-100 samples for each observation area. The consultant 
enters the data into the secure Joint Commission CONNECT extranet and findings are 
generated providing charts and statistical analyses of the data.   
  
16
During the ‘Analyzing Data Phase’, the consultant presents evidence-based 
findings to the surgical team for discussion of factors contributing to safe and risky care. 
Collectively, the surgical team generates solutions for immediate and long-term 
improvement. Noteworthy is that many organizations are surprised to find vast 
inconsistencies in practice discovered during this phase.   
During the ‘Implementing Solutions Phase’, the consultant empowers staff to 1) 
implement prioritized solutions generated from the previous phase and 2) identify at least 
one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse, technician and/or surgeon to serve 
as an informal change agent and reinforce new actions or behaviors in the surgical 
booking area, pre-op holding area, and the operating room. All solutions must be 
implemented to make the greatest impact of reducing the risk of WSS and creating a 
culture of safety.  This is a critical decision-making time for the team, that is, they either 
change identified problems or resume old patterns that increase their risk of WSS.  
The hallmark of the ‘Sustaining the Gains Phase’ is that quality improvement has 
occurred and is demonstrated in fewer errors/defects and/or greater adherence with best 
practices in reducing the risks of WSS. In this phase, the consultant helps the team 1) 
reflect on their plan and outcomes, 2) acknowledge their improvement and processes 
learned, 3) verbalize successes to internal and external stakeholders, and 4) set in place 
guidelines to preserve gains and sustain achievements. Several solutions to sustain gains 
are to train new WSS observers, perform monthly observations for continued compliance, 
and continuance of JIT coach training.  
There is a paucity of research evidence related to the effectiveness of the TST 
Program on reducing WSS.  The Joint Commission (Health Research & Educational 
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Trust and Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare, 2014) conducted a pilot 
test of the effectiveness of the TST Program in reducing WSS was conducted among 8 
participating hospitals and ambulatory centers.  The pretest analysis of WSS-related 
errors was classified according to the location of where the error occurred, i.e., the 
scheduling area, the preoperative holding area or the operating room. The errors in the 
scheduling, area included but were not limited to unverified booking documents, verbal 
requests for surgical booking, illegible handwriting and unapproved abbreviations.  
Errors in the pre-operative holding area included but were not limited to missing primary 
documents, unresolved preoperative paperwork, inconsistent use of site marking, and 
rushing during patient verification.  Errors in the operating room included but were not 
limited to lack of site verification, distractions during Time-Out, omitted Time-Out, or 
Time-Out performed without full surgical team participation.  
Role of the Nurse Consultant in Facilitating Change in Health Care Organizations 
The role of the nurse consultant is to empower health care providers and 
organizations with the knowledge and skills necessary to provide quality-based, safe and 
cost-effective patient care. Manley (2001) identified six core skills and qualities required 
of a nurse consultant:  
1) Apply the practice of nursing to a specific client group, 2) Have leadership and 
strategic vision for the organization, 3) Use evidence of literature that focuses on 
day-to day issues in nursing practice, 4) Facilitate practice development and 
structural,  5)  Create a learning culture, one that enables all members of the 
interdisciplinary team to learn and develop their potential, and 6) Provide a 
continuum of consultation from the individual at the clinical level to the managers 
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and directors at the organizational level in terms of the provision of patient-
centered services.  (p. 30)   
Hicks, James, Hill, and Vanterpool (2012) discovered that patients who received 
care at clinics led by nurse consultants reported significantly positive medical outcomes 
when compared to clinics without nurse consultants.  In this study, participants reported a 
feeling of partnership with the nurse consultant and this partnership instilled a feeling of 
confidence in the patient’s ability to better control their diabetes. In another study, 
Manley (2000) reported that nurse consultants provided clear direction and vision to 
patients and staff, motivated others to use their clinical skills, and helped develop 
evidence-based practice.   
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare 
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley et al., 2009) as a consultation 
framework to facilitate organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention 
of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site, procedure using the TST Program 
among a surgical team (schedulers, preoperative personnel, perioperative personnel, and 
surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi. The methodology is 
organized as follows: 1) Design; 2) Setting, 3) Population and Sampling Plan, 4) 
Treatment, 5) Measurement Tools, 6) Training Observers/Data Collectors, 7) Procedures, 
8) Protection of Human Subjects, 9) Limitations, and 10) Proposed Data Analysis.  
Design 
This capstone project was focused on quality improvement and used a quasi-
experimental design with a prediction and control approach.  
Setting 
The setting for this project was one ambulatory surgery center (ASC) with four 
(4) operating rooms in south Mississippi.  ASCs are “modern health care facilities that 
provide same-day surgical care to include but not limited to diagnostic and preventive 
procedures” ("What is an ASC?" 2014, para. 2).  These health care facilities offer patients 
an alternative to hospital-based procedures in a convenient, patient-centered experience. 
This 100% physician-owned ASC provides care for the following specialties: ear-nose-
throat (ENT), gastroenterology, general surgery, ophthalmology, orthopedic, pain 
management, and plastic surgery.   
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Population and Sampling Plan 
    The subjects/participants for this capstone project were the surgical and support 
staff of one surgical center in South Mississippi. The forty-seven (47) member staff 
worked in the following areas: Surgical Booking Area (n=2 Registered Nurses[RN]); Pre-
op Holding Area (n=6 RNs); and Surgical Areas (n=8 RNs, n=9 Surgical Technicians, 
n=5 Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists [CRNAs], n=5 Anesthesiologists, and n=12 
Surgeons). All participants were either full-time or part-time employees at the surgical 
center and were licensed in their respective specialty areas.  All staff were eligible for 
participation in this project based on employment in the surgical center. A convenience-
sampling plan was used to select the surgery center. There was no random selection from 
the population or random assignment to either an experimental or control group. 
Treatment 
The independent variable was The Joint Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for 
Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program (TST Program) and the dependent variable 
was risk of wrong site surgery. All surgical procedures were eligible for observation in 
this project with the exception of endoscopies and multiple procedures that occurred 
during the same operative case that were performed by different surgeons.   
Measurement Tools 
 
The capstone project utilized three tools to measure risks associated with WSS.  
The tools were the audit forms for the three specific areas of observation:  scheduling, 
pre-op holding, and operating room developed and tested by The Joint Commission. No 
information was provided regarding the validity and reliability of the tools.   
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Audit Observation Forms 
The “Surgical Booking Process Audit Tool” (Appendix D) was comprised of six 
items and was used to record: 1) Specialty (Surgical) Type, 2) How booking was 
received, 3) Receipt of Forms Defects, 4) Booking Form Defect and 5) Coaching if 
necessary. A trained observer who was an RN who has worked in this area for 7 years 
completed this tool.  
The “Pre-Op Holding Process Audit Tool” (Appendix E) was comprised of eight 
items and was used to record: 1) Specialty (Surgical) Type, 2) Primary Document 
Verification, 3) Patient Verification, 4) Rushing Elements, 5) Time-Out Elements, 6) 
Regional Block Elements, and 6) Coaching if necessary. A trained observer who was a 
RN who has worked in this area for 12 months or longer completed this tool.  
The “Operating Room Audit Tool” (Appendix F) was comprised of sixteen items 
and was used to record: 1) Specialty (Surgical) Type, 2) Consent Elements, 3) Rushing 
Elements, 4) Site Marking Elements, 5) Time-Out Elements, and 6) Coaching if 
necessary. This tool was completed by 5 trained observers who were CRNAs who have 
worked in this area for 5 years or longer.  
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Training Observers/Data Collectors 
During Phase II: Training Data Collectors, eight (8) data collectors were trained 
to observe specific events in their respective locations using standardized video training 
materials provided by The Joint Commission TST Program. Training was conducted by 
the nurse consultant and the method for training the eight data collectors consisted of 
having each observer view a 30-minute video produced by the Joint Commission that 
explained the use of the TST Program and the location-specific observation form 
(Appendix D-F) for each of the three areas.  After viewing the instructional video, the 
participant was required to pass the Joint Commission provided 14-item exam with a 
90% or higher. If potential errors were anticipated, then observers were instructed to 
move into the ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching role to prevent an error. Prior to training, all 
observers provided written informed consent to participate in the project. 
Procedures 
The procedure utilized in the capstone project was as follows: 
1. The student, chair, and committee members of the doctoral capstone project have 
successfully completed the Common Course at The University of Southern 
Mississippi and obtained Institutional Review Board approval prior to the conduction 
of the QIP.  The Univeristy of Southern Mississippi IRB approval letter is displayed 
in Appendix H. 
2. Obtained written approval to conduct the quality improvement program (QIP) from 
key stakeholders of the Surgical Center, including the Director and Board of 
Directors (Phase 1: Getting Started).  
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3. Posted informational flyers in strategic areas of the center to alert staff to an 
explanatory meeting about the quality improvement study.  
4. At the beginning of the program, the student serving in the role of consultant 
provided participants with information about conditions of participation:  
a. Participation: Participants may choose to participate and/or not participate in the 
QIP program.  Note: Participants are observed only and do not complete any 
questionnaires. 
b. Program Benefits: The potential benefits of the QIP is that the risks of WSS are 
reduced and that the center is able to 1) identify breakdowns in patient care, 2) 
discover the underlying causes of the breakdown, and 3) generate solutions that 
are organization-specific to the causes of wrong-site surgeries.   
c. Program Risks: There are no identified bio-psycho-social risks, discomforts, 
and/or inconveniences associated with participation in the QIP. 
d. Confidentiality and Anonymity: No participant will complete any questionnaire 
associated with this study. No participant will be identified by name in any audit 
tool associated with this QIP.  On each of the three audit tools, numeric codes will 
be used to identify surgeons and the last four digits of a patient’s record for case 
identification. No participant will be identified by name in any report or 
publication associated with the QIP. No individual data will be shared about any 
staff member with the administration of the surgical center.  Only the student will 
examine, have access to, and enter completed audits into software program for 
data analysis. Electronic data will be password protected and physical data will be 
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locked in a file drawer.  All completed audits will be shredded within three 
months following the analysis of data. 
5. Conducted Phase II: Training Data Collectors – See Training Observers/Data 
Collectors. This phase was accomplished in 2 days. 
6. Conducted Phase III: Measuring Risk Factors. Trained observers recorded practices 
in the Surgical Booking area, Pre-op/Holding area, and Surgical Areas until 50-100 
observations were completed. If potential errors occurred, then the observer moved 
into the ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching role to prevent the error.  This phase was 
accomplished in 2 weeks. Methods to control for threats to validity were executed 
during this phase, that is, the first two days of observations were discarded to 
minimize the Hawthorne effect (Campbell, J., Maxey, V., & Watson, W.,1995).   
7. The consultant entered all data collected into the TST data analysis program via the 
secured Joint Commission Connect Extranet. The TST Data Analysis Program is in 
Excel© format and provides data entry and analysis in numeric and graphic format.  
This program was used by the consultant only. 
8. Conducted Phase IV: Analyzing Data.  During this phase, the consultant presented 
evidence-based findings to the surgical team for discussion of factors contributing to 
safe and risky care. Collectively, the surgical team generated solutions for immediate 
and long-term improvement. This phase was accomplished in 5 days. 
9. Conduct Phase V: Implementing Solutions.  During this phase, the consultant 
empowered staff to 1) implement prioritized solutions generated from the previous 
phase and 2) identify at least one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse, 
technician and/or surgeon to serve as an informal change agent and reinforce new 
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actions or behaviors in the surgical booking area, pre-op holding area, and the 
operating room. This phase was accomplished in 2 weeks. 
10. Conduct Phase VI:  Sustaining the Gains.  In this phase, the consultant helped the 
team 1) reflect on their plan and outcomes, 2) acknowledge their improvement and 
processes learned, 3) verbalize successes to internal and external stakeholders, and 4) 
set in place guidelines to preserve gains and sustain achievements.  This phase was 
presented in 1 day but is an on-going process.  
11. Will destroy completed audits by shredding within three months following the 
analysis of data and no later than one month after graduation.  
Protection of Human Subjects 
 In order to ensure the protection of human subjects, the student, chair and 
committee members of the doctoral capstone project successfully completed the CITI 
Common Course at The University of Southern Mississippi and sought Institutional 
Review Board approval prior to the conduct of the QIP. Written approval to conduct the 
quality improvement program (QIP) from key stakeholders of the Surgical Center, 
including the Director and Board of Directors was completed during the first phase, 
Getting Started, of the QIP.  At the beginning of the program, the student serving in the 
role of consultant provided participants with information about conditions of 
participation.  Participants chose to participate or not participate in the QIP program.  
Participants were observed and did not complete any questionnaires.   
 The potential benefits of the QIP is that the risks of WSS are reduced and that 
the center is able to 1) identify breakdowns in patient care, 2) discover the underlying 
causes of the breakdown, and 3) generate solutions that are organization-specific to the 
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causes of wrong-site surgeries. There were no identified bio-psycho-social risks, 
discomforts, and/or inconveniences associated with participation in the QIP. 
No participant was identified by name in any audit tool associated with this QIP.  
On each of the three audit tools, numeric codes were used to identify surgeons and the 
last four digits of a patient’s record for case identification. No participant was identified 
by name in any report or publication associated with the QIP. No individual data was 
shared about any staff member with the administration of the surgical center.  Only the 
student examined, had access to and entered completed audits into software program for 
data analysis. Electronic data was password protected and physical data was locked in a 
file drawer.  All completed audits will be shredded within three months following the 
analysis of data. 
Limitations 
 A limitation of this QIP was that only one ASC was used and the facility is small 
when compared to a freestanding hospital.  When compared to other surgery centers, the 
ASC used in this study was classified as “medium”, having 3-4 operating rooms (Fields, 
2011, p. 1).  The number of observations recommended by the Joint Commission is 100 
for each of the three areas:  scheduling, pre-op holding, and operating room.  
Observations totaling less than this number could result in a misrepresentation sample 
and therefore render the pretest data inaccurate or misleading.   
  Proposed Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics, that is, frequency distributions and measures of central 
tendency were used to analyze the data. A comparative analysis of differences in mean 
compliance scores between ‘Measuring Risk Factors Phase’ and ‘Implementing 
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Solutions Phase’ was conducted using the TST Data software developed by The Joint 
Commission. The TST Data Software was used to: 1) Enter data from the three audit 
tools, 2) Generate charts based on the data, and 3) Analyze and interpret the data.  The 
rate of defective case charts are defined and displayed in Appendix G. 
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CHAPTER III 
 ANALYSIS OF DATA  
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare 
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley et al., 2009) as a consultation 
framework to facilitate organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention 
of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site, procedure using The Joint 
Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program 
among a surgical team (schedulers, preoperative personnel, perioperative personnel, and 
surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi.  The analysis of data is 
organized as follows:  1) Rate of Defect Defined, 2) Presentation of Findings, and 3) the 
Implementation of Targeted Solutions.  
Rate of Defect Defined 
The TST Program (Defect Defined, 2015, p. 4) defined a defect in any of the three 
areas of observation as “a risk point for wrong site surgery…referring to a process that is 
or could be inconsistent with organization policy…a single operative case may have 
multiple defects”.  The findings from this study revealed that there were defects in each 
of the three areas of observation.  
Presentation of Findings 
The project was conducted in one ‘medium-sized’, physician-owned, ambulatory 
surgical center in south Mississippi across a six-month time period.  A convenience 
sample of forty-seven (47) staff including RNs, surgical technicians, CRNAs, 
anesthesiologists and surgeons participated in the study. Eight observers were trained to 
collect data in the surgical booking, pre-op holding, and operating room.   
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Baseline data was collected by trained observers during Phase III: Measuring 
Risk Factors and are reported according to the three areas of observation:  surgical 
booking, pre-op holding, and operating room.   Improvement data was collected by 
trained observers during Phase IV: Implementing Solutions and are reported according to 
the three areas of observation:  surgical booking, pre-op holding, and operating room.    
Surgical Booking Findings 
Baseline findings revealed that there were 63 observations made in the Surgical 
booking area. The rate of defective cases in this area was 16% (Figure 3). The most 
common errors were 1) surgical form not received within 48 hours (83%, n=5 
observations) and 2) date and time of procedure missing (25%, n=2 observations). No 
‘Just-in-Time’ coaching were provided during this time frame. 
Improvement findings revealed that there were 64 observations made in the 
Surgical booking area. The rate of defective cases chart shows improvement from 16% to 
9% (Figure 3). The most common errors were 1) surgical form not received within 48 
hours (n=5 observations) and 2) date and time of procedure missing (n=1 observations). 
No ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events were provided during this time frame. 
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Figure 3.  Line graph for baseline and improvement rate of defective cases in surgical 
booking based on days observed that show a defective rate improvement from 16% to 9% 
based on 64 post-test observations.   
 
Pre-op Holding Findings 
Baseline findings revealed that there were 95 observations made in the Pre-op 
Holding area. The rate of defective cases in this area was 87% (Figure 4). The most 
common errors were 1) errors on primary document verification (41%, n=78 
observations), 2) errors in patient verification (38%, n=67 observations), 3) errors in 
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elements of ‘Time-Out’ (15%, n= 26 observations), and 4) elements of ‘rushing’ (3%, 
n=6 observations). One ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching event was provided during this time 
frame. 
Improvement findings revealed that there were 98 observations made in the Pre-
op Holding area. The rate of defective cases in this area improved from 87% to 53% 
(Figure 4). The most common errors were 1) errors in patient verification (54%, n=48 
observations), 2) errors on primary document verification (32%, n=20 observations), 3) 
errors in elements of ‘Time-Out’ (15%, n= 13 observations).  There were no errors in 
rushing observed during this time period. There were no ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events 
provided during this time frame.
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Figure 4.   Line graph comparison between the baseline data to the improvement data of 
defective cases in pre-op holding based on days observed.  The defective case rate 
improved from 86% to 53% based on 98 observations.   
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Operating Room Findings 
Baseline findings revealed that there were 56 observations made in the Operating 
Room area. The rate of defective cases in this area was 73% (Figure 5). The most 
common errors were 1) errors in elements of ‘Time-Out’ (90%, n=83 observations), 2) 
errors in consent elements (5%, n=5 observations), and 3) errors in site marking elements 
(4%, n= 4 observations). There were no ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events provided during 
this time frame. 
Improvement findings revealed that there were 68 observations made in the 
Operating Room area. The rate of defective cases in this area improved from 73% to 25% 
(Figure 5). The most common and only error was in elements of ‘Time-Out’ (n=18 
observations). There were no ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events provided during this time 
frame. 
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Figure 5.  Line graph for baseline and improvement rate of defective cases in surgical 
booking based on days observed that show that the improvement phase defective case 
rate improved from 73% to 25% when compared to the baseline phase. 
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The Implementation of Targeted Solutions  
Once the baseline data was collected, the results were analyzed during Phase IV: 
Analyzing Data in order to identify and prioritize targeted solutions to reduce the risk of 
WSS.  During Phase V: Implementing Solutions, the consultant collaborated with staff to 
1) implement prioritized solutions generated from the previous phase and 2) identify at 
least one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse, technician and/or surgeon to 
serve as an informal change agent and reinforce new actions or behaviors in the surgical 
booking area, pre-op holding area, and the operating room. The Targeted Solutions 
chosen and implemented by the surgical team are presented below in the following order:  
surgical booking, pre-op holding, and operating room.   
Surgical Booking Area  
The targeted solutions chosen by staff for implementation in the surgical booking 
area to reduce the risk of WSS in their area were: 1) to improve communication between 
scheduling and pre-admissions departments and 2) to establish an OR schedule fax back. 
Each strategy is described below. 
In order to improve communication between the scheduling and pre-admissions 
department, the staff adopted two best practices strategies. Strategy one consisted of the 
following: If booking documents are not compared between departments and changes 
communicated before the day of surgery, inconsistencies are forced to be resolved the 
day of surgery resulting in confusion and elements of rushing in attempts to stay on time.  
This could cause the patient to have a negative perception or lack of trust if asked to 
confirm inaccurate information the day of surgery.  In order to improve communication 
between scheduling and pre-admissions department, the pre-admission staff will compare 
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the history and physical examination (H&P) and consent forms with the operative 
schedule to ensure information is complete and consistent.  The following flow sheet 
(Figure 6) demonstrates the pre-admission verification process.
 
Figure 6.  Visual map documenting the improved flow of information between the 
scheduling and pre-admissions department. 
 
The second strategy adopted was the OR schedule fax back.  Incorrect OR 
schedules lead to the need to correct the OR schedule and primary documents producing 
possible delays in surgery start times.  The OR schedule is confirmed with the 
physician’s office the day before surgery but this call can occur at an inconvenient time, 
resulting in missed or incorrect information regarding details of the procedure.  In order 
to reduce the risk of incorrect information, the OR schedule will be faxed to the 
physician’s office by 5 p.m. the day prior to surgery and included in the fax will be a 
deadline for the office to fax back the schedule with any changes.    
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Pre-op/holding Area 
The following targeted solutions were chosen by staff for implementation in the 
pre-op/holding area in order to reduce the risk of WSS in their area: 1) Assure that 
primary documents are available 48 hours before surgery, 2) Establish a standardized 
patient verification process, and 3) Implement a regional block Time Out (TO).      
 In order to assure that primary documents are available 48 hours before surgery, 
the staff adopted three best practices strategies. Primary document that arrive at the 
surgery center prior to surgery may contain errors.  Failing to verify information on the 
primary documents and continuing to communicate misinformation can increase the risk 
of WSS.  Each organization establishes their guidelines of how far in advance a surgical 
consent can be signed by the physician.  One requirement that is universal is there must 
be a physician signature and date on the consent.  In order to eliminate the occurrence of 
missing or incomplete primary documents, the preadmissions personnel will compare the 
information on the consent to that on the H&P and OR schedule.  When inconsistencies 
are discovered, the physician’s office will be contacted before the day of surgery so that 
corrections can be made.  
 A standardized patient verification process is the first line of defense in reducing 
the risk of WSS.  There exists the perception that patients will be irritated by the need to 
repeat requests to identify themselves.  However, the risk of WSS far outweighs the 
decision to omit the patient verification process.  In order to improve the patient 
verification process, all members of the surgical team will verify patient information in 
the pre-op/holding area. 
 A common surgical error is that regional blocks, such as retrobulbar block for 
  
38
cataract surgery are being conducted without a Time Out. These surgical procedures are 
often performed in the pre-op/holding area and not in an OR.  The incidence of block 
procedures is increasing and so is the incidence of related errors. The staff confirmed that 
prior to starting a regional block regardless of setting, i.e., the pre-op/holding area or OR: 
1) a regional block TO will be performed and verified by a team member and 2) the 
correct procedure site and side will be verified by a team member.   
Operating Room Area 
 The following targeted solutions were chosen by staff for implementation in the 
operating room area in order to reduce the risk of WSS in their area: 1) Role-based TO, 
and 2) Standardize surgical site marking.  Each strategy is described below. 
In most organizations, the TO is conducted by a single individual who reads the 
required information, i.e., name of patient, second patient identifier, procedure, site, and 
surgeon to the surgery team. Many times members of the surgical team are actively 
engaged in other duties and are not listening to the TO information.  Common 
contributing factors to the disengaged team is the belief that the TO is of little value to 
the team, team members may be distracted or talking during the TO, misinformation 
regarding who should initiate the TO, and confusion as to when the TO should be 
initiated.  The standards of practice established by The Joint Commission (2015) are that 
1) the TO should be initiated after patient prep and drape but immediately before skin 
incision, 2) all members of the team should be involved in the TO process and stop all 
other activities and conversations during the TO process, and 3) verbal confirmation of 
the TO information is then confirmed by all team members.  The staff agreed that in 
order to improve the role-based TO process: 1) the TO will be scripted and consistent 
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across all surgical procedures and 2) adopted the Comprehensive Surgical Checklist 
established by the Association of periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN-Appendix C).     
In order to avoid WSS and to promote patient safety, it is critical that the process 
for surgical site marking be standardized.  Unfortunately, there are a myriad of site 
marking systems that are used, that is each surgeons may use a different mark, patients 
sometimes mark themselves, and the same mark may mean something different to each 
individual.  A standardized system of site marking is a safety strategy for the patient, the 
surgical team and the facility. Finally, a standardized mark, such as the surgeon’s initials 
versus the use of an ‘X’, which could be interpreted by some as ‘no’ and ‘yes’ by others, 
or use of dots or lines with arrows, creates less confusion over which site mark is correct.  
In order to clarify the various types of site markings, the surgery team decided to use the 
surgeon’s initials as the standardized surgical site marking system. Standardization means 
that all personnel at the facility will know which site marking to look for and use.  The 
staff agreed that in order to standardize surgical site markings, the surgeon’s initials will 
be placed on the patient’s skin closest to the site of proposed incision.   
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare 
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley et al., 2009) as a consultation 
framework to facilitate organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention 
of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site, procedure, using The Joint 
Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program 
among a surgical team (schedulers, preoperative personnel, perioperative personnel, and 
surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi.  The chapter is 
organized as follows:  1) Summary of Findings, 2) Discussion, 3) Recommendations, and 
4) Conclusions. 
Summary of Findings 
The major findings of this project were that by implementing the Targeted 
Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© QIP program, the nurse consultant was able to assist 
the surgical center in reducing the risk of wrong site surgery from 16% to 9% in the 
surgery booking area, from 86% to 53% in the pre-op holding area, and from 73% to 25% 
in the operating room area.  These results mirror the findings from the original 8 hospitals 
and ambulatory centers participating in the pilot test of the TST Program (Joint 
Commission, 2013).  Further, the consultant empowered the surgical team to make nine 
(9) critical decisions in practice that would have the greatest impact on reducing the risk 
of WSS and creating a culture of safety:   
1) Identified at least one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse, 
technician and/or surgeon to serve as an informal change agent and reinforce new 
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actions or behaviors in the surgical booking area, pre-op holding area, and the 
operating room;  
2) Improved the communication system between scheduling and pre-admissions 
departments; 
3) Established an OR schedule fax back; 
4) Assured that primary documents would be available 48 hours before surgery;  
5) Established a standardized patient verification process; 
6) Implemented a regional block Time Out (TO);  
7) Role-based TO;  
8) Standardized a surgical site marking; and 
9) Adopted the Comprehensive Surgical Checklist established by the Association of 
periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN-Appendix C).     
Discussion 
The findings from this QIP capstone project reflect the conceptual and evidence-
based literature regarding the importance of reducing medical errors and, in particular, 
efforts to reduce the risks of WSS (Agrawal, 2014; IOM, 1999; Kelly, 2012;  Mulloy & 
Hughes, 2008) through the use of  1) a universal protocol for preventing WSS (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2015; AORN, 2015; CTH, 2011; WHO, 2015); 2) a 
standardized system of site verification (IOM, 1999; Joint Commission, 2015b); and 3) 
resolving human and system failures contributing to WSS (DeVine et al., 2010; Dunn, 
2006; Hempel et al., 2013; Mulloy, 2008; Stahel et al., 2010). 
Nurse consultants play a critical role in empowering health care providers and 
organizations with the knowledge and skills necessary to provide quality-based, safe and 
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cost-effective patient care (Manley, 2001; Hicks et al., 2012). In this QIP project, the 
nurse consultant utilized both the IHI (Langley et al., 2009) and TST (Joint Commission, 
2015d) programs to enable staff to reduce the risk of WSS. The consultant found that 
each step of the TST program was easy to use, readily understood by the organization, 
and amenable to replication.  There were no difficulties in entering data or generating 
charts in the TST software program. In terms of data analysis, the software program is 
limited to generating rate of defective cases chart, the defect ranking chart, and the 
comparison chart. But after completing each step of the TST, the level of detail provided 
was adequate.    
Recommendations 
 A limitation to this quality improvement program was the length of observation 
time in the baseline and improvement phases.  When this QIP project is replicated, the 
Joint Commission recommendations should be adhered to, that is 100 observations from 
each of the three areas with no more than 4-5 observations per day.    
Conclusions 
The findings of this quality improvement program reflect great improvement in 
not only the way the surgery center reduced the risk of WSS but in the way the 
organization communicated their common goals of patient safety, job performance, and 
risk reduction.  Most of the information presented was not new to the surgery team.  
When individuals were asked if they understood the elements of a Time Out, nearly 
everyone knew what they were ‘supposed to do’ yet the findings show that knowing and 
doing are sometimes far apart.  Like all organizations, the challenge this organization 
faces lies is the last phase of the TST, Sustaining the Gains.  As personnel leave the 
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organization and new employees are hired, the standing policies and lessons learned from 
the program risk fade from practice.  Left in place to educate the surgery team on the 
importance of patient verification and risks of WSS are the JIT coaches, the 
administrators, and trained observers from this program.  Without support of all three, 
changes adopted with each chosen Targeted Solution will be lost.   
WSS is an avoidable event that compromises patient safety. Nurse consultants 
play a powerful role in enabling surgical staff to utilize the TST Program to re-examine 
their existing practice, change behaviors as needed, and create a culture of safety in 
reducing the risks of WSS and promoting patient safety.  
 
  
  
44
APPENDIX A 
 
THE UNIVERSAL PROTOCOL BY THE JOINT COMMISSION 
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APPENDIX B 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION SURGICAL SAFETY CHECKLIST 
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APPENDIX C 
AORN COMPREHENSIVE SURGICAL CHECKLIST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREPROCEDURE 
CHECK-IN 
SIGN-IN 
 
TIME-OUT 
 
SIGN-OUT 
 
In Holding Area Before Induction of Anesthesia Before Skin Incision Before the Patient Leaves the Operating 
Room 
Patient/patient representative 
actively confirms with Registered 
Nurse (RN): 
RN and anesthesia care provider 
confirm: 
Initiated by designated team member 
All other activities to be suspended (unless a life-
threatening emergency) 
RN confirms: 
Identity  □ Yes 
Procedure and  procedure site  □ Yes 
Consent(s)  □ Yes 
Site marked  □ Yes         □ N/A 
by person performing the procedure 
 
RN confirms presence of: 
History and physical  □ Yes 
 
Preanesthesia assessment   
□ Yes 
 
Diagnostic and radiologic test results  
□ Yes         □ N/A 
 
Blood products   
□ Yes           □ N/A 
 
Any special equipment, devices, 
implants    
□ Yes         □ N/A 
Confirmation of: identity, procedure, 
procedure site and consent(s)  □ Yes   
Site marked  □ Yes  □ N/A 
by person performing the procedure 
 
Patient allergies □ Yes  □ N/A 
 
Difficult airway or aspiration risk? 
□ No 
□ Yes (preparation confirmed) 
 
Risk of blood loss  (> 500 ml) 
□ Yes  □ N/A 
# of units available ______ 
 
Anesthesia safety check completed 
□ Yes   
 
Briefing:  
All members of the team have 
discussed care plan and addressed 
concerns 
□ Yes   
Introduction of team members  □ Yes   
All:  
Confirmation of the following: identity, 
procedure, incision  site, consent(s)   
□ Yes   
Site is marked and visible  □ Yes       □ N/A 
 
Relevant images properly labeled and displayed  
□ Yes          □ N/A 
 
Any equipment concerns? 
 
Anticipated Critical Events 
Surgeon: 
States the following: 
□ critical or nonroutine steps  
□ case duration   
□ anticipated blood loss  
 
Anesthesia Provider: 
□ Antibiotic prophylaxis within one hour    
    before incision    □ Yes       □ N/A 
□ Additional concerns?  
 
Scrub and circulating nurse: 
□ Sterilization indicators have been  
    confirmed  
□  Additional concerns?  
Name of operative procedure   
Completion of sponge, sharp, and 
instrument counts  □ Yes         □ N/A 
Specimens identified and labeled   
□ Yes            □ N/A 
Any equipment problems to be addressed?  
□ Yes            □ N/A 
 
 
To all team members: 
What are the key concerns for recovery and 
management of this patient?  
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
_________________________________ 
 
June 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Include in Preprocedure check-
in as per institutional custom: 
Beta blocker medication given 
(SCIP)  □  Yes     □  N/A         
Venous thromboembolism 
prophylaxis ordered (SCIP)   
□Yes      □  N/A 
Normothermia measures (SCIP) 
□  Yes  □ N/A 
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APPENDIX D 
SURGICAL BOOKING PROCESS AUDIT TOOL 
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APPENDIX E 
PRE-OP HOLDING PROCESS AUDIT TOOL 
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APPENDIX E 
PRE-OP HOLDING PROCESS AUDIT TOOL 
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APPENDIX F 
OPERATING ROOM AUDIT TOOL 
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APPENDIX F 
OPERATING ROOM AUDIT TOOL 
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APPENDIX G 
 
RATE OF DEFECTIVE CASES CHART (PROPORTION OR P CHART) 
 
What is a rate of defective cases chart?  
A rate of defective cases chart, also called a proportion or P chart, analyzes the percent 
(or proportion) of defective surgical cases. It also shows the rate of defective cases. This 
chart is especially helpful when dealing with inconsistent sample sizes, for example, 
when the number of observations varies widely on a daily basis.  
Why do you need a rate of defective cases chart?  
A rate of defective cases chart shows your percentage of defective cases on a daily basis 
and how it decreases over time. A key benefit of the rate of defective cases chart is that it 
shows when you have significantly improved.  
What types of data are displayed in a rate of defective cases chart?  
1. Control limits: Lines above and below the average line. The control 
limits reflect variations in the defective case rates over time. Typically, 95 
percent of the data will fall within the control limits. Data that fall outside 
the control limits are represented by a red dot, signifying that the process 
has changed. These dots show when a process is “out of control” – either 
negatively (upper control limit) or positively (lower control limit). The 
control limits usually start wide as the rate of defective cases varies greatly 
day-to-day and become narrower as rates decrease and remain in a 
consistent, high range. Because the number of daily observations can 
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impact the width of the control limits, it is important to have a consistent 
number of observations every day. Five to 10 observations per day is 
recommended.  
2. Trend line: Each point on the line represents the number of cases with 
one or more defects (i.e., defective cases) for each day. Most of these 
points will fall within the control limits (see #3). In the sample chart, you 
will see that the points on the line that fall outside of the control limit lines 
are represented by a red dot. Red dots signify special circumstances that 
should be investigated to determine what was different on this day 
compared to other days. For example, the special circumstances may be 
related to the successful implementation of an intervention. It is important 
to understand the cause of special circumstances because they can become 
“quick wins” to reduce the risk of wrong site surgery. For instance, if you 
can identify that the defects involve one particular type of surgery rather 
than all surgeries. The goal is to move these points lower, until they 
reach or exceed your goal defective case rate (i.e., 50 percent 
improvement from baseline rates) and sustain it. This means that you have 
achieved significant improvement in your process. Note: If you are 
collecting a very small sample size, such as one or two observations in a 
day, this can cause the trend line to vary significantly and make it difficult 
to determine the direction of improvement. 
3. Stage line: The stage line shows the end of the baseline data collection 
period and the start of interventions to reduce the risk of wrong site 
surgery. The stage line provides a before and after comparison of rates of 
defective cases.  
4. Average line: The red line represents the overall average (or mean) rate of 
defective surgical cases that have been found to have at least one defect. 
The average may be recalculated every time data is entered into the 
database. The goal is to move the average line down from the baseline 
phase, which means the rate of defective cases is decreasing.  
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